Add an option to force run workflows from the repo default branch #2497
+254
−2
Conversation
This file contains hidden or bidirectional Unicode text that may be interpreted or compiled differently than what appears below. To review, open the file in an editor that reveals hidden Unicode characters.
Learn more about bidirectional Unicode characters
When using OIDC to obtain cloud credentials in workflows, using the digger workflow from the PR branch might be a security issue. Malicious actors could modify the workflow or add any other workflow to a PR to obtain cloud credentials without any way for code owner approvals preventing this. By being able to force the use of the digger workflow from the repository's main branch, the cloud roles can be configured to only trust runs on that branch, which can in turn be secured using typical PR approvals. That way, malicious workflows could only end up there after having passed a review. It is not an option to implement this option inthe digger CLI / digger.yml. This could then be modified in a malicious PR.
Sign up for free
to join this conversation on GitHub.
Already have an account?
Sign in to comment
1 participant
Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.
This suggestion is invalid because no changes were made to the code.
Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is closed.
Suggestions cannot be applied while viewing a subset of changes.
Only one suggestion per line can be applied in a batch.
Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.
Applying suggestions on deleted lines is not supported.
You must change the existing code in this line in order to create a valid suggestion.
Outdated suggestions cannot be applied.
This suggestion has been applied or marked resolved.
Suggestions cannot be applied from pending reviews.
Suggestions cannot be applied on multi-line comments.
Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is queued to merge.
Suggestion cannot be applied right now. Please check back later.
When using OIDC to obtain cloud credentials in workflows, using the digger workflow from the PR branch might be a security issue. Malicious actors could modify the workflow or add any other workflow to a PR to obtain cloud credentials without any way for code owner approvals preventing this. By being able to force the use of the digger workflow from the repository's main branch, the cloud roles can be configured to only trust runs on that branch, which can in turn be secured using typical PR approvals. That way, malicious workflows could only end up there after having passed a review.
It is not an option to implement this option in the digger CLI / digger.yml. This could then be modified in a malicious PR.
Potential discussion points:
🧠 Ai UsageDetails (if applicable):
Code generated by Copilot; modified, reviewed and verified manually.