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🤖 Automated Content Update
This PR was automatically generated by the HackTricks News Bot based on a technical blog post.
📝 Source Information
🎯 Content Summary
Scope and ID
Real-world Android attack chain against DuckDuckGo for Android (Android ≤ 13) that enables arbitrary file exfiltration via Intent-scheme handling and legacy auto URI-permission grants. Tracked as CVE-2025-48464.
Targeted data
DuckDuckGo’s Sync & Backup feature generates a sensitive PDF named
Sync Data Recovery - DuckDuckGo.pdfcontaining a QR code and alphanu...🔧 Technical Details
Intent-scheme pivot to ContentProvider reads. If a browser parses
intent:URLs and launches them, embed acontent://URI (pointing to a victim app’sFileProvider) and set thecomponent=to an attacker-exported Activity. On Android ≤13, includeS.android.intent.extra.TEXT=...(or HTML_TEXT) to trigger the framework’s legacy auto-add ofFLAG_GRANT_READ_URI_PERMISSION. After the browser’s one-tap confirmation, the attacker Activity callsContentResolver.openInputStream()to read and copy the file.Abusing app-internal intent routing. When a WebView’s
shouldOverrideUrlLoading()delegates to logic that classifies and parsesintent:schemes (e.g., viaIntent.parseUri()) and then callsstartActivity(), the browser effectively acts as a privileged proxy. Attackers rely on that proxy to originate the Intent so the platform tre...🤖 Agent Actions
I analyzed the blog and HackTricks structure, found the best spot, and implemented the update.
What I added
Repository exploration
Decision on placement
Changes implemented
Technical references used
Tool actions performed
No other files required modification. The content follows HackTricks style, includes code blocks, and provides a concise, reusable technique abstraction with PoC and defenses.
This PR was automatically created by the HackTricks Feed Bot. Please review the changes carefully before merging.