Fix template injection risk in copilot-session-insights workflow (#4001)

Author: Copilot

.github/workflows/copilot-session-insights.lock.yml

@@ -93,6 +93,8 @@ steps:
     continue-on-error: true
     env:
       GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GH_AW_COPILOT_TOKEN || secrets.GH_AW_GITHUB_TOKEN }}
+      # Security: Pass step output through environment variable to prevent template injection
+      EXTENSION_INSTALLED: ${{ steps.install-extension.outputs.EXTENSION_INSTALLED }}
     run: |
       # Create output directory
       mkdir -p /tmp/gh-aw/agent-sessions
@@ -112,7 +114,8 @@ steps:
       # Check if gh agent-task extension is installed
       if ! gh agent-task --help &> /dev/null; then
         echo "::warning::gh agent-task extension is not installed"
-        echo "::warning::Extension installation status from previous step: ${{ steps.install-extension.outputs.EXTENSION_INSTALLED }}"
+        # Security: Use environment variable instead of template expression in bash script
+        echo "::warning::Extension installation status from previous step: $EXTENSION_INSTALLED"
         echo "::warning::This workflow requires GitHub Enterprise Copilot access"
         echo "SESSIONS_AVAILABLE=false" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
         exit 1

.github/workflows/copilot-session-insights.md

@@ -0,0 +1,119 @@
+# Template Injection Prevention in Workflows
+
+## Overview
+
+This document explains the template injection security fix applied to workflows in this repository to prevent potential code injection attacks via GitHub Actions template expansion.
+
+## What is Template Injection?
+
+Template injection occurs when untrusted data flows into GitHub Actions template expressions (`${{ }}`) that are evaluated during workflow execution. This can lead to:
+
+- Code execution in workflow steps
+- Information disclosure
+- Privilege escalation
+
+## The Vulnerability Pattern
+
+**Unsafe Pattern:**
+```yaml
+steps:
+  - name: My Step
+    run: |
+      echo "Value: ${{ steps.previous.outputs.value }}"
+```
+
+If the output value contains malicious content, it could be executed when the template is expanded.
+
+## The Fix
+
+**Safe Pattern:**
+```yaml
+steps:
+  - name: My Step
+    env:
+      MY_VALUE: ${{ steps.previous.outputs.value }}
+    run: |
+      echo "Value: $MY_VALUE"
+```
+
+By passing the value through an environment variable, the content is treated as data, not executable code.
+
+## Changes Made
+
+### copilot-session-insights.md
+
+**Issue:** Template expression used directly in bash echo statement
+- **Line:** 115
+- **Risk:** While using step output (controlled), the pattern could lead to injection if changed to use untrusted data
+
+**Fix Applied:**
+```diff
+  - name: List and download Copilot agent sessions
+    id: download-sessions
+    continue-on-error: true
+    env:
+      GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GH_AW_COPILOT_TOKEN || secrets.GH_AW_GITHUB_TOKEN }}
++     # Security: Pass step output through environment variable to prevent template injection
++     EXTENSION_INSTALLED: ${{ steps.install-extension.outputs.EXTENSION_INSTALLED }}
+    run: |
+      # ...
+      if ! gh agent-task --help &> /dev/null; then
+        echo "::warning::gh agent-task extension is not installed"
+-       echo "::warning::Extension installation status from previous step: ${{ steps.install-extension.outputs.EXTENSION_INSTALLED }}"
++       # Security: Use environment variable instead of template expression in bash script
++       echo "::warning::Extension installation status from previous step: $EXTENSION_INSTALLED"
+        echo "::warning::This workflow requires GitHub Enterprise Copilot access"
+        # ...
+```
+
+### mcp-inspector.md
+
+**Status:** No template injection vulnerabilities found
+- The "Setup MCPs" step name is static text
+- Environment variables use secrets, which are safe
+- No untrusted data flows into template expressions
+
+## Security Best Practices
+
+When writing GitHub Actions workflows:
+
+1. **Never use untrusted inputs directly in template expressions:**
+   - ❌ `${{ github.event.issue.title }}`
+   - ❌ `${{ github.event.issue.body }}`
+   - ❌ `${{ github.event.comment.body }}`
+   - ❌ `${{ github.head_ref }}` (can be controlled by PR authors)
+
+2. **Use sanitized context instead:**
+   - ✅ `${{ needs.activation.outputs.text }}` (sanitized by gh-aw)
+
+3. **Pass data through environment variables:**
+   ```yaml
+   env:
+     UNTRUSTED_VALUE: ${{ github.event.issue.title }}
+   run: |
+     echo "Title: $UNTRUSTED_VALUE"
+   ```
+
+4. **Safe context variables (always safe to use):**
+   - `${{ github.actor }}`
+   - `${{ github.repository }}`
+   - `${{ github.run_id }}`
+   - `${{ github.run_number }}`
+   - `${{ github.sha }}`
+
+## References
+
+- [GitHub Actions Security Hardening](https://docs.github.com/en/actions/security-guides/security-hardening-for-github-actions)
+- [Understanding the risk of script injections](https://docs.github.com/en/actions/security-guides/security-hardening-for-github-actions#understanding-the-risk-of-script-injections)
+- Issue #3945 - Static Analysis Report (November 14, 2025)
+
+## Validation
+
+Both workflows compile successfully after the fix:
+- ✅ `copilot-session-insights.md` - Template injection fixed
+- ✅ `mcp-inspector.md` - No vulnerabilities found
+
+```bash
+./gh-aw compile copilot-session-insights --validate
+./gh-aw compile mcp-inspector --validate
+```