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[MDEV-31585] Stop trusting or relying on client identifying information sent prior to the TLS handshake
The server has heretofore improperly mishandled—and TRUSTED—information sent
in the plaintext login request packet sent prior to the TLS handshake.
As a result of this, the client is *forced* to send excessive and
exploitable identifying information in the pre-TLS-handshake plaintext login
packet. That client-side vulnerability is CONC-654.
This modifies the server to stop relying on any of the information in
the pre-TLS-handshake plaintext login packet EXCEPT for the single bit
that tells it that a TLS handshake will follow. It furthermore adds an
"extended capability" bit to the server greeting packet, which informs
the client that it is safe to send a bare-bones dummy packet containing
ONLY the instruction that a TLS handshake will follow:
/* Server does not mishandle information sent in the plaintext
* login request packet sent prior to the TLS handshake. As a result, the
* client can safely send an empty/dummy packet contianing no
* identifying information. Indicates that MDEV-31585 has been fixed.
* Since ??.?.
*/
#define MARIADB_CLIENT_CAN_SEND_DUMMY_HANDSHAKE_PACKET (1ULL << 37)
All new code of the whole pull request, including one or several files
that are either new files or modified ones, are contributed under the
BSD-new license. I am contributing on behalf of my employer Amazon Web
Services, Inc.
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